First let me tell you about a wonderful invention of mine, the Life-of-the-Party Machine. Here's how it works: As each guest arrives at your party, the Vigilator "locks on" to that guest for a few minutes, establishing a communication channel of high mutual information, so that the structures of some of its own internal states come to be identical to the objective structures of the guests -that's phase one. In phase two, the Extrapolator selects a subset of those structures "for their ability" to anticipate the guest's reactions to the other guests; and finally, in phase three, this subset of structures guides the Life-of-theParty Machine in the selection of the beverage for each guest that will optimally "tune" the "impending" behaviors of all the guests, so that everybody ends up having a wonderful time. That's how it works, and of course it's still a bit sketchy and no doubt will need some modifications along the way, but now that I've worked out the basic idea, from here on out it's engineering's baby.
This won't do, alas, for even if the basic idea were fine, all the hard problems have been kicked downstairs to engineering, with scarcely a clue about how they are to be solved. I proffer this parody of Sayre's target article in a tentative and apologetic spirit. I am probably missing the point and conjuring up a strawman. It is now Sayre's tum to explain why my parody is unfair, why he is not confusing the "specs" of a system with its deSign, why his various proposals take us a step or two forward, instead of backward, as they seem to me to do. What puzzles me is that Sayre apparently levels the very charge I have just expressed against him against Gibson (1966) -correctly, in my opinion: "even in its unsimplified version it provides few details about how exactly the perceptual systems accomplish this, or about the nature of the information they are supposed to provide." So apparently Sayre thinks he has moved significantly beyond Gibson in these regards. Apparently he thinks he has an alternative to Man (1982) , for instance, rather than just a theory sketch at a less specific level, though I cannot see why.
At one point Sayre offers a telling analogy with the television's tuning circuits, "whose activities possess a high degree of mut~:u information with respect to selected sets of input signals. This is a somewhat ominous analogy, since it characterizes the desired effect of such a tuning circuit, rather than the means ~ which the effect is achieved. In the case of the tuning circuit, e means are well enough known that this is a legitimate specification. Can the same be said for all the various "info(t)" processes that Sayre must invoke in his account? There seems to me to be a striking difference in explicitness in Sayre's descriptions of processes, and at just the crucial place: where he must turn the corner from what he calls info(t) to info(s).
Sayre begins with the claim that a (desirable) relation between distal objects of perception and the cortical states that represent them is high mutual information. We can all agree on that; everyone from Gibson to Marr to Fodor (1975) to Winograd (1972) supposes that a necessary condition of (good, useful) representation is high fidelity -accuracy plus informativenessand the mathematical theory of communication (MTC) concept of high mutual information captures this nicely. If others make less of this condition than Sayre does, perhaps it is because they take it for granted. It is quite clear that there are many ways of meeting this necessary condition, as shown by Sayre's relatively detailed account of noise reduction and tuning, occurring between what he calls the Retina and the Accumulator. So long as we are on MTC's home turf of maintaining high mutual information relations, its resources are indeed impressive, but this necessary condition does not distinguish vision from television. We still have to get the Discriminator and the Abstractor working, if we are to have any account at all of vision and the promised info(s), and when Sayre turns to them, his accounts get sketchier.
The Discriminator is to operate rather like an analysis-bysynthesis process, one gathers. The task is to find "stable patterns that will both (a) serve well in the guidance of current behavior and (b) maintain a high degree of mutual information with events at the Retina." Sayre describes an MTC method for meeting the second criterion -but note that it is crucial that the relata are events at the Retina, not distal events, which the Discriminator cannot observe, on pain of regress. But what MTC process can select patterns meeting criterion (a)? We get a rosy description of a process that tests the effects on the guidance of behavior of "advancing" a pattern to a position of control, and while this sounds right phenomenologically, Sayre can hardly claim to be cashing out his phenomenology in the good hard coin ofMTC. And when we turn to the Abstractor, we get more handwaving -acknowledged, to be sure, but then where is the contribution of MTC to cognitive science?
The way to tum the comer and distinguish vision from television, Sayre notes, is to design a system that will have the right sort of negentropic coupling and negentropic flexibility. There is nothing to quarrel with here, and nothing new except the language. We must figure out how we get constancy of perception out of all the variability on the retina, but of course it has to be the right constancy -the right mix of negentropic coupling and negentropic flexibility. As Gibson saw (and Sayre saw that Marr saw that Gibson saw), this is the central "how" question, but Sayre seems to me to be no closer to giving an answer (right or wrong) than Gibson was. Indeed, in spite of the terminological innovation, he does not seem even to have given a more perspicuous setting of the question. If we had a scaling defined for negentropic coupling or flexibility (as we do for mutual information), we might have some new powers of description, and hence problem setting, but so far as I can see, given several different negentropic couplings, or flexibilities, there is no prescribed way of saying which gets the higher rating. Compare two moths, one with second-rate eyes and a second-rate but lightweight brain, and the other with eagle eyes (more structure for more info(t)), but more weight to lug around, hence greater energy demands -which creature has struck the better negentropy bargain? When does it improve one's negentropy coupling to tum off one's information-gatherersand sleep, for instance? I do not want to disparage these questions; on the contrary, they strike me as well worth pursuing, but precisely because their answers are not obvious, one cannot simply fix everything but info(t) at some standard value and then declare that (always, or even in general) more info(t), or higher mutual information relations, is a Good Thing. Many increases in info(t) result in decreases in safety, efficiency, and so forth . Moreover, of course, claiming that a certain trade-off would be optimal does not explain by subsumption under a law (there is no law of nature to the effect that design will be optimal), but rather generates a hypothesis to test -and leaves the question of mechanism untouched (Dennett 1983) .
Sayre realizes all this, for he draws attention to the familiar point that "the posterior branch [retina to visual cortex} has as its main function to cut back radically on the amount of info(t) passed on to the cortex, while at the same time retaining just those info(t) structures that are important for the guidance of the organism's current behavior (Section 10, paragraph 5). But he has not yet shown that the description of processes for performing this latter task has been advanced by his proposed innovations. Moreover, he has not shown that he has any real alternative to approaches that treat this part of the problem as a "computational" problem in the sense he disparages.
His main criticism of that school of thought, by the way, is curiously undercut by his own proposals . What is wrong, he says, with AI (artificial intelligence), is that "the symbols involved in machine calculation in and by themselves are not about anything at all." But the same would be true of the stable patterns selected by the Discriminator in virtue of their prowess in behavioral control: In and by themselves -that is, independently of their relational, nonintrinsic properties such as the property of yielding high mutual information relative to something distal-they are not about anything at all. There are many things wrong with various versions of the" machine calculation" paradigm in AI, but failing to do justice to intrinsic intentionality is not one of them. By Sayre's own lights, intentionality is some sort of extrinsic property -presumably definable in the terms of MTC, after all -so there is no such thing as intrinsic intentionality.
